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  NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-3233 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
                                    
 v. 
 
SEZAYIR BULAMAN, 
    Appellant 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D. C. Criminal No. 1-12-CR-00794-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 12, 2018 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, VANAKSIE, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  December 26, 2018) 
 
_______________________ 
 
OPINION1 
_______________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
1 This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Sezayir Bulaman appeals his conviction after pleading guilty to possessing five or 
more kilograms of cocaine in violation of provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and related 
offenses. He argues that his conviction was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment 
right to a Speedy Trial as incorporated in the Speedy Trial Act and that the District Court 
erred in denying the motion in limine that he filed in an attempt to prevent a confidential 
informant from translating audio recordings that the Government sought to admit into 
evidence at trial. He also claims that the court erred in accepting the Government’s 
position that he should only receive a one-point reduction in his offense level under 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) because he waited until the eve of trial to enter his plea. For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
 Bulaman correctly notes that his plea agreement did not contain an explicit waiver 
of appellate rights. However, he incorrectly concludes that the arguments which he now 
attempts to raise therefore survived his guilty plea. Even absent an express waiver of 
appellate rights, it is a “general rule that a guilty plea, intelligently and voluntarily made, 
bars the later assertion of constitutional challenges to the pretrial proceedings.”2 One 
exception to that general principle, which does not apply here and which Bulaman does 
not attempt to claim, is that a plea does not waive jurisdictional defects. Bulaman cites 
Class v. United States,3 to argue that constitutional defects (such as the one he relies on) 
                                              
2 Lefkowitz v. Newsom, 420 U.S. 283, 288 (1975). 
3 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018). 
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are not extinguished by a guilty plea unless the plea agreement explicitly provides for 
such a waiver.  
 In his Reply Brief, Bulaman relies upon Class to argue that that his constitutional 
challenge survives his guilty plea. However, there, the Supreme Court merely held that a 
guilty plea does not bar a subsequent challenge to the constitutionality of the statute a 
defendant was convicted of violating. The Court explained: “[t]he question is whether a 
guilty plea by itself bars a federal criminal defendant from challenging the 
constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal. We hold it does not.”4 In 
reaching that conclusion, the Court explained that it had held for over 150 years that a 
guilty plea waives almost all objections to a prosecution that could otherwise have been 
raised on direct appeal but that “if the facts alleged and admitted do not constitute a 
crime, . . . the defendant is entitled to be discharged.”5 That does not help Bulaman here. 
The conduct he admitted to during the course of his guilty plea colloquy clearly 
established the crime to which he pleaded guilty. Accordingly, he has waived the 
evidentiary and Speedy Trial Act claims he now attempts to raise.  
 Nevertheless, even though Bulaman’s alleged claims of error did not survive his 
plea, we note that the Government’s brief contains a chart which dutifully cites to the 
record and shows why many of the delays on the timeline of Bulaman’s Speedy Trial Act 
claim are excluded from counting against the Government under the Speedy Trial Act.6  
                                              
4 Id. at 803. 
5 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
6 See Appellee Br. at 9–11. 
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 Bulaman’s challenge to the one-point reduction in his offense level pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) based on the timing of his plea is properly before us. However, it is 
meritless. The District Court quite properly considered that he had vigorously contested 
the prosecution for a year and a half before entering his guilty plea on the eve of trial. 
The delay resulted in the Government having to prepare for trial on two different 
occasions before the matter was ultimately scheduled for a change of plea.  
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of sentence. 
